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COMPARATIVE PRIDE
Christopher Morgan-Knapp
Binghamton University
Abstract: Comparative pride – that is, pride in how one compares to others in some respect –
is often thought to be warranted. In this paper, I argue that this common position is mistaken.
The paper begins with an analysis of how things seem when a person feels pride. Pride, I
claim, presents some aspect of the self with which one identifies as being worthy. Moreover, in
some cases, it presents this aspect of the self as something one is responsible for. I then go on
to argue that when the focus of one’s pride is comparative, things are never as pride makes
them seem. The core problem is that if the performance in which one takes pride is really
valuable, the fact that it is superior to the performance of others does nothing to contribute to
that value. I conclude with a discussion of why so many are inclined to validate comparative
pride and a response to those who claim that comparisons are essential to pride because they
must be used to set standards of excellence.

Pride is central to our conceptions of ourselves, and hence to how we live our lives.
Looking back over our lives, points of pride (or their absence) loom large in our
assessments of how we have done, and are among the building blocks of our self-esteem.
Our self-esteem, in turn, informs our choices in all sorts of ways, making us confident or
cautious as we confront new challenges. And looking forward, as we survey our options,
which choice will set (or keep) us on a path that we can be proud of will often figure
prominently in how appealing we find it.
This pervasive influence on our choices means that it matters whether our feelings of
pride are rational or not. For if our pride is not fitting, if it does it does not accurately
reflect our value and the value of what we do, its influence on our choices is likely to be
pernicious. It will distort our practical deliberations rather than inform them.
My thesis in this paper is that pride is a rational, fitting and reliable guide to our worth
only when it is based on attributes of ourselves that don’t essentially involve comparisons
to others. While legitimate pride will be grounded in our achievements, it won’t be
grounded in our competitive success. Doing well should often be the basis of pride. Doing
better than others should not.
This is not the prevailing view within philosophy, nor, I think, within our contemporary
culture. As it is much easier for a philosopher to document the prevalence of a view in
philosophy, that is where I will focus my attention. But I suspect a moment’s reflection
will suffice to bring to mind plenty of examples of comparative pride in ordinary life.
What’s more, along with being common, comparative pride is not treated as suspect or as
worth getting over, as say, fear of garter snakes might be. Instead, it is encouraged: the
winners among us are often told how proud they should be of their being victories.
As far as philosophers are concerned, many of those who have taken a position on the
question think that rational pride always has a comparative basis. Some of these
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philosophers hold that this is so because the emotion of pride includes a judgment with
explicitly comparative content. Richard Taylor, for instance, believes that “Pride is the
justified love for oneself. . . Genuinely proud people perceive themselves as better than
others, and their pride is justified because their perception is correct.” (Taylor: 100)
Similarly, Aaron Ben-Ze’ev claims that “Both shame and pride acknowledge a profound
difference when one compares oneself with others,” and adds that so understood, it often
has “a positive value.” (Ben-Ze’ev: 244) And to take one more example, Arindam
Chakrabarti, drawing inspiration from Hume, sees a person’s pride as essentially
involving a belief that there is some good feature that “she alone has … or [that]she is one
of only a few that have [it]....” (Chakrabirti: 37)
The upshot of Robert Nozick’s view is similar, although the route is less direct. On his
view, emotions of self-assessment need not wear their comparative content on their sleeve.
Feelings of self-esteem, for instance, are based on a belief that one possesses significant
quantities of some socially valued attribute or talent. So far, there is no explicit reference
to others. But Nozick goes on to suggest that what counts as a “significant” quantity of
some valued attribute, must at root be defined comparatively. “There is no standard of
doing something well, independent of how it is or can be done by others.” (Nozick: 244)
As a result, even if a person can have a feeling of self-esteem that doesn’t involve an
occurrent representation of how they compare to others, their standards of success are
necessarily derived from their views of how their valuable attributes compare to others’.
In what follows, I will show why I think all of these views are mistaken. But before I begin,
I’d like to present what I hope will be a shared intuition that will presage where the
argument is headed, and which might help make my admittedly heterodox position seem
more attractive.
The thought is to be found, not without some irony, in Nozick’s discussion of self-esteem.
In a footnote at the end of his argument for the rationality of comparative self-evaluation,
he asks us to consider the following statement by Timothy Leary:
‘It’s my ambition to be the holiest, wisest, most beneficial man alive today. Now
this may sound megalomaniac, but I don't see why. I don’t see why… every
person who lives in the world, shouldn’t have this ambition. What else should you
try to be? The president of the board, or the chairman of the department, or the
owner of this and that?’ (Leary: 218)
Here is what Nozick has to say about it:
There is certainly no objection to wanting to be as holy, wise and beneficial as
possible, yet an ambition to be the holiest, wisest, most beneficial person alive
today is bizarre. Similarly, one can want to be as enlightened as possible … but it
would be bizarre to want especially to be the most enlightened person alive, or to
be more enlightened than someone else. How one values one’s degree of
enlightenment depends only upon it, whatever others are like. This suggests that
the absolutely most important things do not lend themselves to such comparative
evaluation; if so, the comparative theory offered in the text would not hold
universally. (Nozick: 244)
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The basic idea of this paper is that what is true of ‘the absolutely most important things’
in life is true of all appropriate bases of pride: none of them lend themselves to
comparative evaluation. Nozick is right that enlightened people don’t pride themselves on
being more enlightened than others. On my view, this is not because of something special
about the goal of enlightenment. Rather it is because, being enlightened, they see that
such comparative pride is always a mistake.
What kind of mistake is Leary making? There are several candidates. One possibility is
moral: in being or (aspiring to be) proud because of one’s superiority to others, one
embraces an attitude that is objectionable on moral grounds – perhaps this way of
thinking about oneself is incompatible with thinking of one’s fellow humans as equals.1
Another diagnosis of Leary’s mistake is prudential. In making preeminence so central to
his self-assessment, Leary sets himself up for either disappointment or self-deception,
neither of which are conducive to a good life when experienced in large doses.2
The kind of mistake that will be my focus here, however, is neither moral nor prudential.
Instead, it is theoretical. When I say that comparative pride is irrational, what I mean is
that it is never a fitting response to one’s own attributes; that it is always unwarranted;
that it is the emotional equivalent of a false belief. Comparative pride presents things as
being some way that they are not.3
Establishing such a conclusion will take two steps. First, we will need a clear picture of
how pride presents things to those who feel it. When one is proud of oneself for something,
how is one taking the world to be? Then, given an answer to this analytical question, the
second step will be to ask when, if ever, things are actually this way when what one is
proud of involves a comparison with others. If the answer is, as I believe, that the world is
never the way that comparative pride presents it as being, then comparative pride is
always irrational.
As the word ‘pride’ and its inflections are ambiguous, it is worth pausing to more precisely
specify my target. The pride I will be concerned with is an episodic emotion. This
distinguishes it from the sense of ‘pride’ that is typically being used when we refer to
someone as a ‘proud person.’ People who are proud in this sense have a character trait
that partly consists of a disposition to feel the episodic emotion of pride, but there is more.
Proud people also feel entitled to the recognition they believe they deserve on the basis of
the things they are proud of, and are consequently distressed when it is not forthcoming.
So while the analysis of the emotion of pride in what follows will be relevant to
understanding the character trait proud people have, there is more in this trait that I will
not speak to.4

Robert C. Roberts (1991) discusses some reasons for thinking comparative pride is morally
objectionable.
2 The prudential costs of comparative pride appear to beset even those with more modest goals.
See Kasser (2002).
3 This way of understanding the rationality of emotions is central to recent sentimentalist accounts
of value. For an important early discussion, see Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson (2000).
4 One author who does tackle an analysis of this trait is Kristjan Kristjansson (2001).
1
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Closer to my focus is what we typically refer to as ‘self-esteem.’ Like the pride I will be
discussing, ‘self-esteem’ often refers to a positive conative attitude that has the self as part
of its focus.5 But unlike pride, it needn’t have an intentional object. When one feels pride
in the sense being discussed here, one is always proud of something specific about oneself.
Self-esteem, on the other hand, is a free-floating sense of one’s overall value: one doesn’t
have self-esteem of something in particular. That said, in the normal case, a person’s selfesteem is causally related to the amount of pride they take in their attributes or
accomplishments. The more often and more intensely a person feels proud of something,
the higher their self-esteem is apt to be. And although I will not argue the point here, I
think that this connection implies that if comparative pride is irrational, then self-esteem
that is built on a foundation of comparative judgments will be irrational as well.
So the pride I will be discussing is a positive emotional experience focused on the self that
has an intentional object. Of course, this is true of other emotional experiences as well,
such as being pleased that something about oneself is the case. One thing that
distinguishes pride is that it involves a judgment that the attribute is valuable, noble or
worthy. This is partly indicated by the fact that pride is an emotion with a positive
valence. But being pleased about something also has a positive valence, but needn’t be an
instance of pride. One might be pleased that one is wearing pink shoes, for instance, but
fail to be proud of that fact. Similarly, we can imagine a compulsive person who is happy
that they have locked the front door for the twelfth time, but not proud that she has. In
both cases, what would prevent the person’s positive attitude towards some property she
possesses from being pride is that she does not take wearing pink shoes or having
repeatedly locked the same door as being something valuable, noble or worthy.
Other positive emotions share this evaluative judgment as well, such as admiration and
awe. Unlike these, however, pride’s object must be something that bears some close
relation to the person who experiences it. What is the nature of this close relation? The
answer, I think, depends on what kind of pride one feels. The objects of one kind of pride
are simply attributes of the self with which one identifies. This kind of pride is a
cornerstone of identity politics: people often proclaim that they are proud to be gay or
black or a woman or an American. Less politically, people sometimes feel pride when
their alma mater wins a national championship, or when their grandparent’s heroism in
war is celebrated. Let us call this kind of pride ‘identity-pride.’6
As these examples suggest, the attributes that one is identity-proud of can be entirely
outside one’s control. Whether the relationship between a person and the ground of her
pride is ‘close’ is a matter of the role it plays in her conception of herself: if something is
important to what kind of person she takes herself to be, if it is an attribute in terms of
which she, and perhaps others think of her, then it is eligible to serve as the basis for
pride.7 The fact that a person who feels pride identifies with what she is proud of explains
‘Self-esteem’ can also refer to a disposition to having feelings of self-esteem, as when we say that
a person ‘has high (or low) self-esteem.’
6 Neu (1998) discusses this form of pride.
7 Gabriele Taylor (1985: 30-32) characterizes the connection between a person who feels pride
and its object as having something to do with belonging – i.e. a person who is proud of something
takes that thing to belong to them or themselves to belong in some way to it.
5
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why it includes a boost to her sense of her own standing: if she conceives of herself partly
as descendant-of-Simon-Bolivar, then she is apt to feel the light of his noble exploits shine
on her as well as him; if she does not take this lineage as important to who she is, then she
is apt to be impressed by his deeds, but not think that they bear in any significant way on
what kind of a person she is. In the first case but not the second, she will be proud of the
fact that she is his descendant.
Identity-pride contrasts with another kind of pride, which we often express with the
locution “proud of myself for.” Things that one is proud of oneself for have to be things
that one is responsible for or that one deserves credit for. We can well imagine a person
who is proud of being wealthy, no matter how that wealth was acquired; but it would be a
mistake for a person to be proud of herself for being wealthy if her wealth was due to a
windfall inheritance bequeathed by a relative whom she never knew. Or even more
clearly, if less realistically, imagine a person who, as a prank, calls in a fraudulent bomb
threat to a day care center. Just after the teachers evacuate everyone inside, the building’s
boiler happens to explode, destroying one of the classrooms. It would be perverse for this
person to be proud of themselves for having saved the toddlers’ lives. The explanation for
this is that being proud of oneself involves assessing oneself as an agent. When we are
proud of ourselves, it is what we have done, or what we are in virtue of what we have
done, that is the focus. It is the self as an agent that is taken to be admirable or noble or
worthy in some respect. When it is important to distinguish this kind of pride from
identity-pride, I will use the term ‘achievement-pride.’
Of course, even the person who inherits wealth is likely to bear some causal responsibility
for her holdings – had she made different choices, she might not have been in a position
to inherit; she might, for instance, have been dead. So the issue is really that things we are
proud of ourselves for have to be things that we are sufficiently responsible for. And given
how finely degrees of responsibility can vary, and given that we are not here discussing a
natural kind, there is apt to be a good deal of vagueness regarding how much
responsibility for an attribute will be sufficient to make it something we can be proud of
ourselves for being or doing. Still, we have plenty of clear cases that can serve as guides.
Those whose wealth is inherited are not sufficiently responsible for it to be proud of
themselves in this regard; while the disadvantaged teenager who through hard work,
perseverance and grit overcomes the odds and is accepted at a good university is
sufficiently responsible to be proud of himself for his accomplishment.
With this understanding of pride in hand, let us turn our attention to comparative pride
in particular. What distinguishes comparative pride is its object – the thing that the proud
person is proud of. We said earlier that the experience of pride involves taking this thing
to be valuable or worthy. In instances of comparative pride, the object involves a
comparison between the self and others, and consequently the value or worthiness of the
object is understood at least partly in terms of how it compares to the attributes possessed
by other people. All evaluation is made relative to some standard; the evaluations in
comparative pride are relative to a standard that essentially involves the value possessed
by others. To illustrate: a person who is proud of their lush and weed-free lawn
experiences noncomparative pride, while a person who is proud that their lawn is the
lushest and freest of weeds in the neighborhood experiences comparative pride; a person
who is proud to have sailed around the world experiences noncomparative pride, while a
5

person who is proud to be the youngest person to have sailed around the world
experiences comparative pride; and so on.
While comparative pride is quite common, we should not overstate the case. For there
are occasions on which a person’s pride is caused by a comparative judgment, yet the
resulting pride is noncomparative. This can happen when the comparative judgment
leads the person to change their view of the value of an accomplishment. In such a case,
the comparison performs an epistemic function, but is not itself the object of one’s pride.
Imagine a young violinist who is encouraged to send in an audition tape to a summer
camp for promising musicians. The acceptance letter she receives back mentions that the
jury found her phrasing to be the most nuanced of the hundreds of applicants they
reviewed. This comparative information might lead to a feeling of pride, but this pride
need not be comparative pride. It will only be comparative if what she is proud of is that
her phrasing was thought to be better than the other applicants’. But that need not be so.
Rather, she could simply be proud of her phrasing. If so, the comparative information
would likely have informed her opinion of the quality of her phrasing: whereas she had
previously taken it for granted, the note may have led her to pay attention to it in a way
that increased her appreciation.
So when you feel pride you have a positive emotional experience that consists partly in
identifying yourself in terms of some valuable attribute you possess. And if it is
achievement-pride you feel, you will also take yourself to be responsible for possessing
that valuable thing. The issue for us, then, is whether things can ever be as our pride
presents them when its object is comparative. Is being better than others something we
can be sufficiently responsible for? Is being better than others in some respect or other
valuable? If not, then comparative pride we feel will be misleading – it will constitute a
false representation – and consequently will be unwarranted, unfitting, irrational.
It will be useful to have a particularly plausible case of comparative achievement-pride to
ground the discussion. Here is one: in 2015, Claire Tuggle set the US national record for
girls in the ten-and-under age group in the 200-yard freestyle with a time of 1:58.20.
Should she be proud not only of how fast and well she swam, but of the further fact that
she swam the 200-free faster than any other American girl aged ten or less ever has? Or,
as seems the case with Timothy Leary’s anticipatory pride in becoming the holiest, wisest,
most beneficial man alive, would such comparative pride be a mistake?
Let us begin with the question of responsibility: was Claire sufficiently responsible for her
achievement for her to be proud of herself for having achieved it? There is one obvious
reason for scepticism – if hard determinists are right, then Claire couldn’t be responsible
for her achievement. That is, if our actions are causally determined and causal
determination erases any responsibility people might have for what they do, then nobody,
including Claire, can warrantedly be proud of themselves for anything.
This is an important point, for hard determinism might well be true. But since an
argument from hard determinism undermines all achievement-pride, it does not
illuminate what is especially problematic about comparative pride. So, for the sake of the
argument, let us set hard determinism aside, assume that people can sometimes be
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sufficiently responsible for what they do to be rationally proud of themselves for doing it,
and address the question of whether Claire’s record-setting falls into that category.
By most ordinary measures, Claire was responsible for her swimming the 200-freestyle in
under two minutes. She trains four days a week for two hours each day, eats well, and
works diligently on her technique. On the assumption that such swimming was worthy,
then ordinary measures would sanction her being proud of herself for her time. But this
would not be comparative pride, and hence not to the present point. What we are
interested in is whether, in addition to the pride she takes in her swimming, she should be
proud of herself for the further fact that this time set a record.
What distinguishes this comparative achievement from the non-comparative achievement
is what others have (or in this case, have not) done. Namely, what makes it the case that
Claire not only swam fast, but record-setting fast was that no other 10-year-old girl had
achieved a similar time. And unless things are much stranger than they appear, Claire
was not responsible for that further fact. The explanation of other children’s failure to
swim two hundred yards in under two minutes does not include any input from her.
Their times are likely attributable to many different things – their own choices, their
parents’ choices, their attitudes, their genetics, their opportunities, and so on – but
Claire’s choices or actions are unlikely to be among them.
So, assuming things are not strange, Claire was not responsible for the specific things that
made her performance not only fast, but record-setting. In this case, if Claire were to be
proud of herself for setting a record in addition to the pride she takes in swimming fast,
that extra, comparative pride would be based on something that she is not responsible for.
Her comparative achievement-pride would thus be misleading; it would falsely present
her record-setting (as distinguished from her simply swimming fast) as something she is
responsible for.
This point generalizes quite broadly. What distinguishes comparative success from noncomparative success is what others have or have not done. And in normal cases, what
others do is not something we can take credit for. Consequently, when we are not only
noncomparatively proud of the value our achievements exhibit, but take an additional
pride in our achievements outshining those of others, we are taking pride in states of
affairs that we are not responsible for bringing about. Such achievement-pride is therefore
unwarranted.
This might be at least part of the explanation for why Leary’s anticipatory pride in being
the wisest person alive seems so odd. When we imagine him being proud of himself for his
wisdom, our focus is on him; when we imagine him being additionally proud that his
wisdom is unmatched, our focus shifts to the lesser wisdom possessed by others. And this
is not something that we imagine him having a hand in bringing about or being able to
take credit for. It thus seems odd that he would be proud of himself for their being not
being so wise.
There will, however, be cases in which people can plausibly claim responsibility for others’
failure to perform to some level. It is possible, for instance, that shortly before a race, a
swimmer puts soap on all his competitors’ starting blocks, and that consequently their
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starts are significantly less strong than they would otherwise have been. And it is possible
that, further, this slowness off the block was enough to make the difference between their
winning the race and his doing so. Absent his intervention, they, rather than he, would
have swum the fastest. In such a case, we might allow that he was responsible for what
makes it the case that he not only swam fast, but faster than his competitors. If so, we
cannot fault any comparative achievement-pride he feels as a result of his victory for
misrepresenting things on these grounds.
Which is not to say that we should be comfortable endorsing such pride. There is surely
something amiss with a person’s taking pride in having won if he achieved this by
interfering with the performance of his competitors. But the offense in such exceptional
cases must lie somewhere other than the absence of responsibility.
The plausible alternative, of course, is the absence of nobility. Besting people when one
has connived to make them perform less well than they are capable of hardly seems
worthy of admiration. And since it is only fitting to take pride in things that are worthy, a
cheater’s pride in winning is unwarranted.
What I will argue now is that what is true of the cheater’s pride is true of all comparative
pride, albeit for somewhat different reasons. All such pride is unwarranted because there
is nothing noble in one person’s being superior to others. As before, it will be helpful to
consider our particular test case – Claire’s record-setting swim. And as before, it is
important to remember that the specific feat we are interested in is the comparative one –
it is her besting all those other ten year-olds. We are not here interested in her having
swum well. We can be sure that she did. Similarly, we are not asking whether there is any
nobility in the degree to which she applied herself in training for competition. Again,
surely there is. What we want to know is whether the fact that she swam faster than any
other American girl who had not yet turned eleven adds anything to the nobility of her
achievement. Put another way, if her time had not set a record, would that have meant
that her excellent swimming was any less deserving of admiration, and that consequently
she should have been less proud of her performance.
Imagine that Claire achieved her time on the same date that she did, and in exactly the
same fashion, but because she was born prematurely, this date fell a few days after her
eleventh birthday. In this case, it would not be true that she had swum faster than any
American ten year-old while she herself was ten. Indeed, rather than setting a record, she
would have failed to rank in the top 100 of that year’s performances in her age group. Is it
plausible to say that her spending the last few days of gestation outside the womb robbed
the world of what would otherwise have been a particularly extraordinary swimming
performance? Would the value of her accomplishment have been any different?
In my view, the answer to these questions is obvious: the precise date Claire’s mother
gave birth to her is irrelevant to the value of her swimming, and hence to the value of her
performance when she swam those two hundred yards in under two minutes. The precise
date she left the womb is, however, determinative of whether her swimming set a record.
And so her record-setting is not the kind of thing that can add value to what she
accomplished.
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Even those who agree that premature birth would not have diminished the value of
Claire’s performance may not yet be convinced that her superiority to others adds no
independent value to her accomplishments. For this particular hypothetical concerns
record-setting, and that may be thought a special kind of case. Records require precise
criteria to define the task they measure, even where no principled precise criteria are
available. Our premature-birth hypothetical trades on one such criterion – birthdate
thresholds in age-group records. It may be thought that the reason premature birth would
have done nothing to change the value of Claire’s accomplishment is that it merely
changes which side of an unprincipled threshold Claire’s achievement would have fallen
on. And since the threshold is, though necessary, arbitrary, this explains why this
particular way of failing to set a record would not have changed the value of her swim.
So let us set record-setting and its troublesome arbitrariness aside. The defender of
comparative pride will want to say that, record or not, there are at least some more-orless ten-year-olds whose failure to swim as fast as Claire made Claire’s swimming
performance better than it otherwise would have been. The question, then, is who those
actual or potential competitors might be.
In some cases, what explains why Claire swam faster than other children is that the other
children were physically incapable of swimming as fast as she. No matter what these tenish-year-olds did, no matter how hard they tried, no matter what choices they made, their
physical characteristics prevented them from swimming that fast. Perhaps, like Michael
Phelps, Claire has especially long arms, feet, hands, and torso and especially short legs.
Perhaps, like nearly all elite sprinters, Claire possesses the gene ACTN3, which is a gene
related to the functioning of fast-twitch muscles and that is found in nearly all elite
sprinters, but that many people lack. 8 Whatever the details are, Claire has physical
advantages that are absent in those ten year-olds that could not possibly have matched
her time, and this advantage explains her being faster than they. This advantage, though,
disqualifies her besting them from being worthy for the same reason that there is nothing
worthy in my being able to run faster than a toddler. There is nothing noble in beating
people who had no chance of performing to your level.
Of course, there likely were some ten year-olds who were capable of swimming as fast as
Claire did, but failed to do so. Some of these failed to perform to her level because they
lacked the resources to realize their potential. Perhaps they did not receive good enough
coaching, or their families weren’t wealthy enough to pay for pool time, or they grew up
before the development of flip turns and gutterless pools. Once again, these explanations
of her superiority to them undermine any extra claim to worthiness her beating them
might generate – her performing better than children who did not have the opportunity
to perform to their physical potential is nothing that should evoke additional admiration.
The social and technological advantages she had and they lacked mean that beating them
is not something that shines any greater light on her performance.
Some others she swam faster than simply didn’t try hard enough, and many never tried at
all. Out-performing those who haven’t really tried, who haven’t put in the effort to realize
their potential, is also nothing that elevates her achievement. As a child, I invented a
8
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game with elaborate rules that involved throwing a ball against the side of our garage,
and then played it for a few afternoons – reflecting all the while that I was the best person
in the world at this game, that no one in history ever played it as well as I did. Even then I
realized that though my world-dominance was a fact, mine was a hollow victory. Or,
consider a less extreme example: a child who otherwise would have beaten Claire comes
in second because they chose to work at the SPCA on Saturdays, whereas Claire went to
practice. In either case, a victory that is secured because one’s competitors chose to focus
elsewhere does not elevate the value of what one does. Performing better than those who
have failed to put in sufficient effort does not add to the goodness one’s own efforts yield.
And, finally, consider those ten year-olds who were capable of matching or besting
Claire’s time, had the opportunity, and put in the necessary effort. What could explain
why they failed? It must be some form of what Nagel calls resultant luck – luck in “the
way things turn out.” Perhaps the otherwise Claire-beating ten-year-old fell off her
skateboard the day before the meet and sprained her knee. Or perhaps the timers
assigned to her lane were all late in stopping their watches. There are all sorts of scenarios,
but when one possesses the competence and exerts the necessary effort to succeed, yet
fails, the explanation has to be that some event outside of one’s control conspires to
prevent success. But if anything, these sorts of slip-ups reduce the amount of the amount
of value the world contains; they do not add to it in virtue of allowing Claire to have
swum faster than these victims of chance.
We have now exhausted the competitors over whom victory generates additional nobility
for Claire. Those she swam faster than either lacked the necessary physical capabilities,
lacked the opportunity to develop them sufficiently, simply did not put in the effort, or
had bad luck. Swimming faster than others because they fall into one of these categories
does not make your accomplishments shine any brighter. She should indeed be proud of
swimming and training so well. But since there is nothing noble or worthy in the
additional fact that she beat the best time of any other ten-year-old, her pride should not
be augmented by the fact that she holds this record, just as it should not be diminished
when the next gifted swimmer bests it.
Though Claire’s case is but one of many initially plausible instances of comparative pride,
the argument just given covers all comparative superiority. In every case, including those
that don’t involve formal competitions, winning is a matter of one’s rivals lacking the
competence, opportunity, effort or luck to succeed. But out-performing others for these
reasons fails to add anything of value to the world above and beyond the noncomparative attributes of that performance. So comparative pride presents things as
being some way they are not. It represents its basis – one’s superiority to others – as
valuable independent of the value of one’s performance considered on its own. And
insofar as it necessarily portrays the world as some way it is not, it is always unwarranted
Earlier I claimed that Nozick was right to see Leary’s aspiration as a mistake, and that the
explanation of the mistake would undermine comparative pride generally. We are now in
a better position to see why. Comparative success depends on features that are irrelevant
to the value that the comparison is carried out in terms of. Being more beneficent than
others, for instance, means that these others were incapable, unlucky, or didn’t try – and
all of these considerations are orthogonal to the goodness of beneficence. However
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beneficent Leary was, the goodness of that beneficence lies in the value of others wellbeing and his causal contribution to the realization of that value. What needs to be added
to this in order to make it the case that others failed to achieve his level – their incapacity,
bad luck, or lack of effort – has nothing to do with what makes beneficence noble. Indeed,
people’s inability to be beneficent, their bad luck in converting their competence into
good results, and their lack of effort in helping others are all things that, from the
perspective of beneficence, are of negative value. And so in aspiring to be not only
beneficent, but to be more beneficent than others, Leary hopes for, and takes anticipatory
pleasure in the prospect of, things that are contrary to value of beneficence. He hopes
others fail to be at least as beneficent as he. In so doing, he appears to value something
that is the contrary of the value which would ground his pride.
Contrary to Nozick’s supposition, the particular bases of Leary’s prospective pride play
no role in this reasoning. What distinguishes the absolute value of what one has done
from the fact that one’s achievement is relatively superior is that others have failed in
their attempts to realize the value to the degree that you have. But this distinguishing fact
– others’ failure – cannot itself be of value. Indeed, it is of disvalue. And this shows that
there is a kind of incoherence in taking pride in being the best. Such pride involves both a
positive valuation of success in that domain – for otherwise it would not be the source of
one’s pride – and a positive valuation of failure in that domain – for one’s superiority is
conceptually dependent on others’ inferiority. The reason that Nozick recognized the
inappropriateness of comparative pride with respect to beneficence, holiness and wisdom,
I suspect, is that here the wrongheadedness of valuing others’ failure is particularly
obvious. Since these are such lofty goods, the mistake of valuing other people’s failing to
exhibit them is glaring. But though less striking, the mistake in adopting the same attitude
in less lofty endeavors is no less real.
Against this point, Leary might claim that he doesn’t really value beneficence, he values
his being beneficent. That is, what he takes to be noble is his own helping of others, not
the helping of others in general. And this, he might continue, removes the incoherence.
One can value one’s own characteristics without committing oneself to any position on
the characteristics of others one way or the other.
The trouble is that Leary isn’t just concerned with his own achievement. He is also
concerned that it compare favorably with anyone else’s. And the reason to care that one’s
own achievement surpasses that of others is because one takes others’ achievements to be
capable of goodness, worthiness, or nobility. To care that your own achievement be
superior only to the worthless performances of others makes no sense. It is only
superiority to the worthy achievements of others that could possibly generate pride. So
the claim that Leary really thinks only his own achievement matters, which is dubious in
any case, doesn’t protect him from the charge that he is simultaneously committed to
valuing the achievements of others and valuing their falling short.
So what has gone wrong? If I am right that comparative pride necessarily involves a
mistaken valuation, and is thus always unwarranted, why is it so common? A first place to
turn for an error theory would be evolutionary psychology. Since so much of what
matters evolutionarily speaking is at root competitive, it would hardly be surprising that a
concern for relative superiority was selected for. If, as seems likely, a desire for winning
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promoted the fitness of hunter-gatherers in the Pleistocene, our brains may well have
been designed to motivate us to compete and give us a shot of chemical reward when we
win. It goes without saying, however, that the fact that we have been wired to desire
victory hardly implies that victory is itself valuable; what is noble and what serves the
propagation of our genes need not go hand in hand.
But it is not just our Pleistocene ancestors’ genes that might have found a drive to win
useful. Even those who are aimed at generating things of true worth might be well served
by competitive urges. For one way to achieve greatness is to strive to achieve superiority
over others. Provided that these others are performing to a high level in some worthwhile
domain, out-performing them is only possible by doing something that is worthy. To be
sure, this explanation is likely to piggyback on a prior desire to win; otherwise it would
make more sense to aim at greatness directly. But if that competitive desire is in place
anyway, it might be well put to the service of spurring worthy performances. Once again,
though, this does nothing to vindicate comparative pride: even if wanting to win
instrumentally promotes worthy achievements, that does nothing to show that winning is
worthy in itself.
And finally, even if one is not particularly moved by competitive desire, paying attention
to how one compares to others may still be wise. For their performances can provide
valuable information about how one’s own efforts are proceeding, what kind of
investments might make what kind of payoffs, where potential hurdles or pitfalls lie, and
so on. Others who are also striving in their own ways are a kind of natural experiment
from which one can indeed learn important lessons.
For all these reasons, then, our focus on how we compare to others is understandable,
sometimes even laudable. But when we go that extra step from paying attention to how
they are faring, or from desiring that we surpass them, to being proud of our superiority,
we step in to error. Our pride expresses our values, not simply our concerns or desires.
Wanting and valuing are closely connected, and persistent desires can morph into
valuation, but they are fundamentally different attitudes. Valuation involves a positive
assessment of the object as such and in general; it implies that the object is worthy of
esteem – not just one’s own but that others’ as well. Desire implies none of these things.
And this can explain our common error. It can make sense to want to be better than
others, but not to be proud that one is. But many of us lack the psychological vigilance
necessary to prevent a slip from being pleased that we have obtained something we want
to being proud that we have done so.
We thus have an adequate explanation, I think, for why so many of us are apt to make
what I have argued is a mistake. There is, however, one problem that remains to be
addressed. Several authors have suggested that pride must be comparative because what
counts as an achievement worthy of pride is measured by a scale that is set by the
achievements of others. At the beginning of this discussion, we saw that Nozick took this
view. More recently, D’Arms and Jacobson have echoed it:
Part of the desire to achieve is surely an aspiration to excellence, and excellence in
various endeavors—from scholarship to the arts, industry, even athletics—
contributes to human flourishing. Yet which accomplishments count as excellent,
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or sufficiently good to be worthy of pride, is largely a function of the performance
of others (especially those who are nearby). This is especially obvious with respect
to athletic excellence. What counts as an excellent sprinter depends on how fast
people are sprinting during the period in which one competes. But reflection
shows that such comparisons play an important role not merely in identifying but
in determining excellence in many domains. Hence, whether one has excelled, in
some of the ways that contribute to one’s flourishing, is partly determined by the
degree to which one’s achievements stand out—albeit among various comparison
classes. (D’Arms and Jacobson, 2006: 123)
If they are right that excellence is both essential to warranted pride and is essentially
comparative, then the conclusion of the argument in this paper would be very strong
indeed. It would be that pride is never warranted, period. For pride would necessarily
involve valuing one’s superiority, and, I have argued, one’s superiority is not valuable.
This implication can be avoided if we deny that the rationality of pride must be
determined by comparing how one’s performance compares to others’. This is not the
place for a full defense of a positive account of reasonable pride, but a sketch may serve to
allay concerns that we are faced with the dilemma of accepting either that there is
something valuable in others’ failure to achieve something worthy or that pride is always
irrational.
Return to how (achievement-)pride presents things: it presents some aspect of ourselves
that we identify with as both something that we are responsible for and something that is
valuable. How much pride you are warranted in taking in something, then, should be a
function of its value and the degree to which you are responsible for it. The more
valuable your achievement the more pride it would be warranted to feel; and the more
responsible you are for your valuable achievement, the more pride it would be warranted
to feel. Neither of these need be determined in relation to what others do. How
responsible you are will be a function of your role in the causal chain that produced the
achievement, and this can be determined without comparing your causal contribution to
that of others. The more your achievement is the product of effort, attention and
commitment, for instance, the more responsible for it you are; the more it is attributable
to luck or inheritance, the less responsible you are. Similarly, how valuable your
achievement is can be determined using a non-comparative standard. To take some of
the examples we have used so far, the faster you sprint or swim, the better your sprinting
or swimming; the more you help people, the more benevolent you are; the more you
understand, the wiser you are; and so on.
On such a view, there is no threshold that it is necessary to cross before an achievement is
‘good enough’ to warrant taking any pride in it at all. If there is any value to some aspect
of yourself with which you identify, and you are sufficiently responsible for producing it,
some degree of pride will be a fitting response. And since there is no such threshold, there
is no need to refer to the performance of others to set it.
Some may object that this makes warranted pride too easy to achieve. Even if the degree
of pride warranted is very small, they will say, there are some ‘achievements’ that are too
modest to warrant any pride whatsoever. I probably exhibited some very small amount of
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nobility in my drive home from work today. But surely it would be a mistake for me to be
proud of myself for such a trivial thing. So some threshold for pride there must be.
I have to admit that there would be something amiss about my feeling such pride. But
that is not to say that the mistake must lie in its being unwarranted. Recall that the notion
of ‘warranted’ and ‘rational’ we have been interested in here is theoretical rather than
practical: it is a matter of whether the way world is corresponds to the way it appears to
be when an emotion is felt. On the present account, the emotion of achievement-pride
presents some feature of oneself as being both valuable and something one is responsible
for. And on the assumption that my drive exhibited some degree of value and that it is
something that I did, then my pride would get things right.
Which is not to say that I should feel it. In many ways, the situation here is the same as
with belief. That a proposition is true does not imply that it makes sense to occurrently
believe it. A person whose mind is full of trivial truths is hardly an ideal epistemic agent
even though they cannot be accused of any factual error. Likewise, a person who feels
pride in response to every little shred of value they produce or exhibit can be far from an
ideal conative agent even though each episode of pride is, strictly speaking, warranted.
For prudential and moral reasons, it is good to be more discriminating in what one
actually takes pride in. Given our limited attentional budget, filling our consciousness
with pride in trivial accomplishments will mean that we fail to attend to things that we
have prudential and moral reasons to give priority. So while there will indeed be
something to be said against most cases of pride in minute ‘accomplishments,’ what
should be said is that they are unwise rather than that they are unwarranted.
There is, to be sure, more work to be done to in order to fill out this sketch of appropriate
non-comparative pride. The point for present purposes, though, is that we can be
confident that recognizing that comparative pride is always unwarranted need not
compel us to conclude that all pride is unwarranted. Pride in our accomplishments should
continue to play a role in our understanding of ourselves and our planning for the future.
But pride in our superiority to others is an error that we should correct, lest it lead us to
act on a mistaken view of what is noble and worthy in ourselves and what we do.9

Binghamton University, US

Many thanks to Charles Goodman and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and
suggestions.

9

14

References
Ben-Ze’ev, A. (1993) ‘The Virtue of Modesty’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 30/3: 235246.
Chakrabirti, A. (1992) ‘Individual and Collective Pride’, American Philosophical Quarterly,
29/1: 35-43.
D’Arms, J. and Jacobson, D. (2000) ‘Sentiment and Value’, Ethics, 110/4: 722–48.
D’Arms, J. and Jacobson, D. (2006) ‘Anthropocentric Constraints on Human Value’, in
R. Shafer-Landau (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 1, 99-126. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Kasser, T. (2002) The High Price of Materialism, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Kristjansson, K. (2001) ‘Pridefulness,’ The Journal of Value Inquiry, 35/2: 165–178.
Leary, T. (1968) The Politics of Ecstasy, New York: College Notes and Texts.
Neu, J. (1998) ‘Pride and Identity’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 22: 227-248.
Nozick, R. (1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Oxford: Blackwell.
Roberts, R. (1991) ‘What Is Wrong with Wicked Feelings?’ American Philosophical Quarterly,
28/1: 13-24.
Taylor, G. (1985) Pride, Shame, and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment, Oxfordshire: Clarendon
Press.
Taylor, R. (1985) Ethics, Faith and Reason, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Yang, N. et al. (2003) ‘ACTN3 Genotype Is Associated with Human Elite Athletic
Performance’, American Journal of Human Genetics 73/3: 627–631.

15

